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The Recommendations of the
International Conference on Population
and Development: The Possibility of the
Empowerment of Women in Egypt
Jennifer Jewett*
Introduction
The United Nations sponsored the International Conference on Population
and Development (ICPD) from September 5 to September 15, 1994 in
Cairo, Egypt.' The Conference resulted in the creation of a plan designed
to control the growth of the global population over the next twenty years.2
The document adopted by the nations participating in the Conference rec-
ognizes that women play an essential role in the program of population
development, but must gain complete control over their reproduction in
order to do so.3 Consequently, the ICPD Program of Action emphasizes
that for the program to succeed, nations worldwide must strive to empower
their female citizens and to provide them with adequate family planning
services and information.4
While none of the participating nations completely opposed any of the
recommendations of the Conference, several Muslim nations expressed
concerns that provisions of the program might conflict with their religious
and cultural values.5 Egypt, for example, asserted that it would implement
the program only to the extent permitted by its constitution and religious
doctrine. 6 Islamic groups in Egypt attacked the proposals of the ICPD,
claiming that they encouraged extramarital sex and prostitution, and
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1996; B.A., Duke University, 1993. 1 would like to
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1. Women Empowered: The Earth's Last Hope (Interview of Nafis Sadik), 11 NEw
PEs. Q. 13 (1994).
2. Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment, Annex, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994) [hereinafter ICPD Programme of
Action]. Population Conference Ends in Compromise, Minma E. ECON. DiG., Sept. 4, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
3. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 2, ch. IV., § 4.1.
4. Id. ch. VII, §§ 7.7-7.8.
5. Egypt, Pakistan and Iran formed a coalition and led the Muslim debate. See Pop-
ulation Conference Ends in Compromise, supra note 2.
6. Id.
29 Coaax. lr'i. Lj. 191 (1996)
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threatened the unity of the family.7 In order to preserve Muslim support of
the Conference, Conference participants agreed that implementation of the
program would include "full respect for the various religious and ethical
values and cultural backgrounds of the signatory countries."8 Egypt may
have agreed to support the Conference program because of this compro-
mise clause. However, the existence of the clause ultimately may prevent
Egypt from implementing the recommendations of the Conference. If
Egypt adheres to the program's mandate only to the extent that it is consis-
tent with Egyptian religious and cultural norms, Egyptian women will
remain powerless and incapable of controlling their fertility.
Part I of this Note describes the recommendations of the International
Conference on Population and Development. Part 11 discusses Islamic
notions of the societal role of women. Part III illustrates how these views of
women are reflected in Egyptian society. This section analyzes the impor-
tance of family and motherhood, the sexual standards imposed on Egyp-
tian women and men, the institution of the veil, and the widespread
practice of female circumcision. Part IV discusses the Islamic influence on
Egyptian law, and Part V outlines past Egyptian attempts to achieve
equality.
Finally, Part VI suggests the reforms that will be necessary for Egypt to
implement the recommendations of the conference. First, Egypt must
eliminate laws that perpetuate traditional gender roles and sexual stan-
dards. These changes must conform with Islamic law, and women's orga-
nizations must play a vital role in the reform process. Second, education
represents the key to empowering women and implementing the popula-
tion plan. Education is essential not only as a socialization tool, but also as
a creator of equal opportunity.
I. Recommendations of the International Conference on Population
and Development
In September of 1994, hundreds of nongovernmental organizations and
173 States participated in the International Conference on Population and
Development sponsored by the United Nations in Cairo, Egypt.9 The Con-
ference document, entitled "The Cairo Document for the International
Conference on Population and Development of 1994," 10 outlines a Pro-
gram of Action designed to reduce the world population growth over the
next twenty years.1 ' The plan is not a binding treaty but rather a standard
7. Mona Eltahawy, Egypt Women Battle Islamists, Traditions, Ratnuas, Sept. 4, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database. Louise Lief, An Old Oasis of Tolerance
Runs Dry, U.S. NEws & WoR RE., Aug. 29, 1994, at 39.
8. John Hooper, Big Issues Slip Past Religious Filibusters, GuADIAN, Sept. 14, 1994,
at 10.
9. ICPD-Egypt Welcomes the Outcome of Conference, BBCMS, Sept. 15, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database; Focus On Population and Development, U.S.
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Sept. 1994, Vol. 5, Supp. No. 8, at 4.
10. ICPD Deputy Chairman Comments on "Cairo Document" and Success of Confer-
ence, BBCMS, Sept. 15, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
11. Population Conference Ends in Compromise, supra note 2.
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which the participants will strive to attain.12 The method of implementa-
tion should reflect the religious diversity, critical values, cultural back-
grounds, and national laws of each country as well as international human
rights standards. 13 Consequently, each country may choose the recom-
mendations that conform with its legal, cultural, and religious standards. 14
The Program of Action offers the following recommendations to slow
the global population growth. First, the document recognizes the family as
the basic unit of society and asks that governments ensure that men share
equal parental responsibilities with women.15 Second, the Program of
Action asserts that the core objective of the plan is gender equality, requir-
ing the empowerment of women.16 Women must gain control over their
reproductive powers so that they may assist in the effort to reduce popula-
tion growth. 17 The Program of Action encourages governments to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in educational, economic, and political
realms in order to empower the female members of their societies.18 In
addition, the document asserts that the participants must provide individu-
als with reproductive rights.19 People must have the right to decide the
number, spacing, and timing of their children.20 Therefore, all states
should provide access to family planning counseling and service.21 The
Program of Action suggests that participants provide adolescent girls with
confidential advice on sexual matters, family planning, and reproductive
health services.22 It also emphasizes the central role that parents must play
by teaching their children to behave responsibly. 23 Finally, the document
recommends that governments encourage women to avoid abortion as a
method of family planning, but provide for the humane treatment and
counseling of women who have chosen to have abortions. 24
Nafis Sadik of Pakistan, the secretary-general of the ICPD, regarded
the conference as an outstanding success, asserting that the Program of
Action has the potential to "change the world."25 However, Dr. Sadik also
12. ICPD-Egypt Welcomes the Outcome of Conference, supra note 9.
13. Focus on Population and Development, supra note 9, at 5.
14. ICPD Deputy Chairman Comments on "Cairo Document" and Success of Confer-
ence, supra note 10.
15. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 2, ch. IV, §§ 4.1, 4.4.
16. Women Empowered: the Earth's Last Hope, supra note 1, at 13. According to Nafis
Sadik, the Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund and the Secretary
General of the International Conference on Population and Development, gender equal-
ity represents the keystone of the plan. Id.
17. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 2, ch. I, § 1.13.
18. Id. ch. IV, §§ 4.1, 4.4.
19. Id. ch. VII, pts. A, B.
20. Id.
21. Id. ch. I, § 1.14 and ch. IV, § 4.12.
22. Id. ch. IV, § 4.20.
23. Id.
24. Id. ch. VII, pts. A, B.
25. Population Conference Ends in Compromise, supra note 2. If the program suc-
ceeds, the world population, currently 5.67 billion, will remain below 7.5 billion in the
year 2015. However, if the program fails, the global population in 2015 could rise as
high as 7.92 billion. Id.
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indicated, "we need a commitment from all countries, industrialised [sic]
countries as well as developing countries, that they will take their full
responsibility .... Without resources ... the Programme of Action will
remain a paper promise."2 6 If Egypt implements only those aspects of the
program that do not violate its current religious and cultural norms, it will
not provide the resources necessary to empower its women so that they
may assist in the effort to slow the population growth in Egypt.
II. Islamic Notions of the Societal Role of Women
Traditional Egyptian gender roles place women and men in separate socie-
tal spheres. Egyptian society confines women to the private, domestic
sphere and demands that they produce children and care for the family.2 7
In contrast, it allows men to emerge into the public realm with the expecta-
tion that they will provide economic support for the family.2 8 The division
of women and men into separate spheres perpetuates the subordination of
women by ensuring that women remain dependent on their male counter-
parts for economic support.29
Islamic leaders continue to advocate the traditional gender roles, citing
passages of the sliaria which indicate that innate differences exist between
men and women.30 They claim that these differences influence both the
sexual needs and the mental abilities of women and men.31 First, women
and men are biologically different. Women menstruate and later experi-
ence menopause, while men maintain their virility throughout their lives.
In addition, women are emotional nurturers, while men are rational and
thus more capable of making decisions.32 Belief in these differences has
resulted in a gender-based division of labor in Islamic society.3 3
Significant numbers of upper and upper-middle class women, who feel
less constrained by the cultural norms imposed by Egyptian society, have
broken out of these traditional roles.34 Lower-middle and lower class
women, however, have not been able to overcome these barriers as easily.35
26. Sadik Urges Action After Population Accord, RtnEns, Sept. 13, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database (quoting Nais Sadik).
27. According to Islam, in the private realm of the family, the husband must act as
the leader, and the wife must attend to the household. 'ABDUR RAumAN I. Doi, WOMAN IN
SHAf'AH (IsL. ic LAw) 11 (1989).
28. A.Em ELowE MAcLEOD, ACCOMMODATING PROTEST: WORKING WOMEN, THE NEw
VEILING AND CHANGE IN CAIRo 84-85 (1991).
29. See id. at 85.
30. Shireen Mahdavi, The Position of Women in Shi'a Iran: The Views of the 'Ulama, In
WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 255, 258 (Elizabeth Warnock Fernea ed.,
1985). The Sharia is Islamic law which emerged from verses of the Koran and decrees of
the Prophet Muhammed. Id. at 255.
31. Id. at 258.
32. Id.
33. Alexandra J. Zolan, The Effect of Islamization on the Legal and Social Status of
Women in Iran, 7 B.C. THIRD WoRiu LJ. 183, 185 (1987).
34. Safia K. Mobsen, New Images, Old Reflections: Working Middle Class Women in
Egypt, in WOMEN Am THE FAmmY IN THE MDLE EAST 56, 56-60 (Elizabeth Wamock
Fernea ed., 1985).
35. Id. at 56, 60-62.
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One reason for this difference among classes is that the less affluent
women believe they must adhere to traditional gender norms in order to
protect the reputations of their families.36 However, over the past two
decades economic hardship has forced many lower-middle and lower class
women into the public work force.37 Unfortunately, traditional gender
roles prevent them from competing in the public realm on equal footing
with men.38 First, women generally receive less education than men. As a
result, they must labor in less satisfying and often menial positions.39 In
addition, women must balance their responsibilities in the private realm
with their responsibilities in the public realm.4° Men do not carry a simi-
lar double burden.41 Consequently, as long as Egyptian society perpetu-
ates the traditional gender roles, Egyptian women will remain unable to
achieve equality with Egyptian men.
III. The Role of Women in Egyptian Society
Many elements of Egyptian culture reinforce the traditional gender roles.
As a result, any attempt to eliminate the concept of separate spheres for
men and women which forms the basis of Egypt's societal structure will
have to overcome considerable cultural barriers.
A. The Importance of the Family and Motherhood
Egyptian society idolizes both the family and the role of motherhood.42
Both the culture and the Constitution of Egypt express the conviction that
the family forms the foundation of Egyptian society.43 As the Constitution
states, the "family is the basis of the society founded on religion, morality
and patriotism."44 In fact, Egyptian men tend to divorce wives who do not
bear children.45 Because women generally depend on their husbands for
economic support,4 6 they attempt to bear many children in order to stabi-
lize the family.47 In addition, because Egyptian society favors the birth of
sons over daughters, most women continue to give birth to children until
36. Id. at 60-62.
37. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 90.
38. 1 define the private realm as the home and the public realm as everything outside
of the home.
39. See Nagat Al-Sanabary, Continuity and Change in Women's Education in the Arab
States, in WOMEN AND m FAMILY iN THE MiDmE EAST 93, 93 (Elizabeth Warnock Femea
ed., 1985); Eric Hooglund, The Society and its Environment, in EGYPE A CouNRy S-ruDy
91, 130 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1990).
40. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 90-91.
41. Id.
42. Hooglund, supra note 39, at 124.
43. Id. at 124; EGYPT CONsr. art. 9.
44. EaGrr CoNsr. art. 9.
45. See JmEHA SADAT, A WoMAN or EGYmr 357 (1987). Statistics revealed a divorce
rate of 4% among women with four children and a divorce rate of 62% among women
who had no children. Id. at 356.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
47. Adel Azer, Law as an Instrument For Social Change: An Illustration From Popula-
tion Policy, in THE CAmO PAPERs IN SocmL SciNcTE LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE 60, 79
(Cynthia Nelson & Klaus Friedrich Koch eds., 1979).
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they have produced at least two sons.48 Unfortunately, this practice hin-
ders the ability of women to achieve equality in the public realm in two
ways. First, by placing motherhood on a pedestal, society encourages
women to remain in the private realm and discourages them from ventur-
ing into the public realm. 49 Second, women who do enter the public realm
must care for several children in order to avoid the perils of divorce and,
therefore, cannot compete with male counterparts who are not burdened
with child care responsibilities. 50 For example, statistics reveal that Egyp-
tian women are less educated than Egyptian men.51 The cultural preroga-
tive that women marry and give birth to children is partly responsible for
this disparity in education. Because education delays marriage and
exposes women to nonfamilial influences, it is often regarded as undesir-
able, especially by members of the lower and middle classes. 52
B. The Sexual Standards Imposed on Egyptian Women and Men
Egyptian culture further perpetuates the traditional gender roles by requir-
ing different sexual standards for women than for men. Egyptian society
recognizes the sexual rights of women but permits women to exercise those
rights only within family boundaries. 53 In addition, unlike Western Chris-
tian culture, Islam dictates that women's sexuality is stronger than that of
men.54 As a result, Egyptian society regards women as "temptresses," who
use their sexuality to entice men, and considers men incapable of resisting
the temptation created by women.55 Consequently, it fears that, unless
women remain secluded in their homes, they will use their sexual power to
destroy not only individuals or families, but also the entire Egyptian
nation.56 According to Islam, a society can do two things to control the
sexual power of women. First, men can satisfy the female sexual desire. 57
Second, men can confine women within rigid, well-defined boundaries.58
48. See Hooglund, supra note 39, at 127.
49. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 82-85.
50. Id. at 90-91.
51. Hooglund, supra note 39, at 146-47. In 1985-86, only 45% of all primary stu-
dents were girls. Approximately 75% of girls between the ages of six and twelve were
enrolled in primary school compared with 94% of boys in the same age-group. In addi-
tion, women represented 32% of all students enrolled in universities. Id.
52. This point of view is especially true for the rural lower class. Children are
regarded as assets because they provide labor in the fields. Therefore, women are
encouraged to give birth to as many children as possible. This mentality undoubtedly
prevents women from gaining access to any educational opportunities. See Halim
Barakat, The Arab Family and the Challenge of Social Transformation, in WoMEN AND THE
FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EAsr 27, 30 (Elizabeth Warnock Fernea ed., 1985).
53. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 83.
54. Nahid F. Toubia, The Social and Political Implications of Female Circumcision: The
Case of the Sudan, in WomEN AND THE FAmny IN THE MIDLE EAST 148, 150-51 (Elizabeth
Warnock Fernea ed., 1985).
55. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 83.
56. Id. at 83; Zolan, supra note 33, at 186.
57. Toubia, supra note 54, at 150-51.
58. Id. at 151.
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Male members of the society believe that they must confine women to
the home in order to protect the honor of their families. Egyptian culture
supports the notion that the sexual behavior and reputation of women rep-
resent the most important elements of family honor and social standing.59
For instance, members of the middle and lower classes often choose not to
send their daughters to school or, alternatively, withdraw them from school
at an early age to ensure that their sexual reputations remain untainted.60
Family honor takes precedence over the education of the female members
of the lineage. 6 ' Therefore, women who do enter the public realm will
compete on unequal footing with their male counterparts who are not
required to maintain similar levels of sexual purity.
C. The Institution of the Veil
Islamic leaders further seclude women by advocating the institution of the
veil (higab). The veil is a scarf that reveals only the faces of women and a
loose fitting blouse and skirt that covers all but their wrists and ankles. 62
It enables women to emerge into the public realm while remaining
secluded. The veil protects men from the temptation of women and also
enables women to maintain their sexual purity by protecting them from the
advances of men.63 According to Islamic leaders, support for the institu-
tion of the veil is found in the interpretation of Koran XXIV:31, which
instructs "[s]ay to the believing woman that they lower their gaze and
restrain their sexual passions and do not display their adornment except to
their husbands or fathers .... -64 However, some scholars claim that the
Koran actually advises both men and women to be modest in their interac-
tions.65 Despite the appearance of Western dress in Egypt in the 1960s,
three-quarters of the women in Cairo today wear the veil.66 There are many
reasons why many women continue to wear the veil instead of wearing
western dress. One of the most obvious reasons is the pressure from
Islamic fundamentalists who emphasize traditional family values and
regard the home as the proper place for women.67
According to Arlene MacLeod, a scholar in this area, there are more
complex reasons for the reappearance of the higab than the Western pre-
sumption that the veil is a return to the medieval version of the Islamic
religion.68 She cites as evidence the fact that significant numbers of edu-
59. See Hooglund, supra note 39, at 127-128; Safia K Mohsen, Women and Criminal
Justice in Egypt, in LAw AND ISLAM IN THE MIDt EAST 15, 17 (Daisy Hill Dwyer ed.,
1990).
60. See Hooglund, supra note 39, at 128.
61. See id. at 127-28.
62. James North, Egyptian Feminists Battle Fundamentalist Backlash, Mo REAL
GAzEtTE, Dec. 20, 1993, at F2.
63. See Hooglund, supra note 39, at 127-28; Zolan, supra note 33, at 185-86.
64. Koran XXIV:31.
65. Zolan, supra note 33, at 186-87.
66. North, supra note 62, at F2.
67. Id.
68. MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 104.
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cated and modernized women have chosen to wear the veil.69 This volun-
tary use of the veil is a symbolic form of protest.70 For lower-middle class
women, the veil serves as a symbolic reconciliation of economic forces and
traditional gender ideals.71 Over the past two decades, the lower-middle
class in Cairo has experienced an economic and political crisis. Significant
inflation and inadequate wages have forced lower-middle class women to
work in order to feed their families.72 According to MacLeod, the veil par-
tially resolves the tension experienced by these women because it
expresses the notion that the wearer holds traditional values. 73 However,
MacLeod acknowledges that the veil not only conveys protest but also sym-
bolizes a woman's acceptance of and accommodation to the power struc-
ture and the conceptions of appropriate female behavior existing in
modem Egypt.74 Veiling permits women to enter into the workplace by
essentially removing the evidence of their gender. Therefore, "Veiling sym-
bolizes acquiescence and active acceptance of the primary female role as
wife and mother; it signals women's accommodation to the structures set
by tradition and supported by men."75
D. The Widespread Practice of Female Circumcision
In addition to the institution of the veil, the widespread practice of female
circumcision ensures the subjugation of women. In effect, Egypt has
granted the male members of society permission to suppress female sexual-
ity by refusing to declare the practice of female circumcision illegal. A non-
governmental organization that works to combat the practice in Egypt esti-
mated that over ninety percent of Muslim and Christian women and girls
are circumcised, often in unsanitary conditions and by unqualified practi-
tioners such as butchers or traditional midwives. 76 Reasons most fre-
quently given for the practice include "religion, custom . . . hygiene,
aesthetics. .. "and the fact that the practice decreases the sexual desire of
women and facilitates sexual relations for men.77 Others claim the prac-
tice "curb[s] women's sexual desires and... maintain[s] the moral fibre of
society."78 Parents have perpetuated this practice for generations because
they believe that circumcision will protect virginity and therefore ensure
the marriage of their daughters. 79
69. Id.
70. Id. at 121.
71. Id. at 121-23, 135. MacLeod claims that for other women, the veiling symbolizes
their disapproval of inflation and the western image of womanhood. Id. at 136.
72. Id. at 121-23.
73. Id. at 121.
74. Id. at 137-38, 140.
75. Id. at 140.
76. Egypt Not To Pass Anti-Circumcision Law, RaTERs, Oct. 19, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
77. Anna Funder, De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNrmaP. PROBs. 417, 437 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Uncircumcised women are less desirable brides, because circumcision is a sym-
bol of purity and virginity. Id.
Vol. 29
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This practice likely succeeds in preserving the sexual purity of many
women. However, it does so in two atrocious ways. First, many of the
girls who are circumcised never have the chance to taint their purity
because they die from complications during the procedure.8 0 One Egyp-
tian physician revealed:
Almost all the young girls in these villages are circumcised in a terrible way.
Sometimes their clitoris and their genitals are removed with scissors, occa-
sionally with broken glass or bits of sharp tin. There is no anaesthesia. If
doctors agree to perform it, they use surgical knives. It can lead to bleeding
and death. We estimate that 30% of girls between seven and twelve who
have complications are left to die-they are said to have suffered 'heart
attacks', so that there will be no criminal charges.8 '
Other health implications include infertility, keloid formation (scars which
shrink the vagina), blockage of menstruation, painful intercourse,
obstructed childbirth, hemorrhaging, tetanus and septicemia from unster-
ile instruments, infection, bleeding of adjacent organs, and shock and pain
from mutilation without anesthesia.8 2
Second, circumcision has a tremendous psychological effect on
women who often choose to avoid sexual relations if possible because they
feel violated and physically imperfect. Psychological consequences can
include frigidity, insatiability, anxiety, melancholy, and depression.8 3
Some believe that the psychological effects are more extensive:
Amputation of the clitoris and sometimes even of the external genital organs
goes hand in hand with brainwashing of girls, with a calculated merciless
campaign to paralyze their capacity to think and to judge and to understand.
For down the ages a system has been built up which aims at destroying the
ability of women to see the exploitation to which they are subjected, and to
understand its causes. A system which portrays the situation of women as a
destiny prescribed by the Creator who made them as they are, females, and
therefore a lesser species of the human race.8 4
Thus, by maintaining the legality of this procedure, Egyptian society
ensures the subordination of women by exerting control over their sexual-
ity and by exposing them to a significant risk of physical, psychological,
and emotional damage.8 5 Not only is circumcision a cruel and barbaric
procedure that eliminates the possibility of gender equality with men, but
it also reduces women's control over their bodies and denies them the right
to reproductive health.
Participants of the ICPD criticized the Egyptian government for pre-
80. Death is not the procedure's only danger. Seventy percent of the menstruation
problems suffered by Egyptian women result from circumcision. Robert Fisk, World
Population Conference: Women Pay Terrible Price For Tradition, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 8,
1994, at 11.
81. Id.
82. Funder, supra note 77, at 435-36.
83. Id. at 436.
84. Toubia, supra note 54, at 148 (quoting Nawal al-Sa'dawi).
85. See id.
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serving a practice that is contrary to the goals of reproductive health.8 6
The ICPD notes that reproductive health care includes respect for the
human body, as well as the right to informed free choice as to whether or
not to have children.8 7 In some respects, Egypt appears to respect the bod-
ies of women. For instance, the Egyptian penal code includes a rape law
that punishes offenders, including husbands, for violating the sexual pri-
vacy of women.88 However, while this may be an attempt to protect the
psychological and physical health of women, it is more likely an attempt to
maintain both the purity of women and the honor of the family. Conse-
quently, participants of the Conference suggested that Egypt declare exci-
sion and clitorectomy illegal.89 Humiliated by the global media attention it
received at the Conference, the Egyptian government quickly drafted a law
banning female circumcision and initiated a media campaign to combat
the practice.90 Egyptian Population Minister Maher Mahran, responding to
ICPD recommendations, insisted that
[c]ircumcision will be considered a crime. Whoever practises [sic] it will be
punished .... But punishment is not enough because the practice has been
ingrained in people as a tradition for thousands of years. There must be an
awareness campaign that highlights the harm of female circumcision and
makes people understand that there is no religion in the world that accepts
it.9
1
Following the Conference, however, the Health Ministry appeared to
have abandoned its efforts to ban the practice. Instead, it developed guide-
lines for performing female circumcision in government hospitals. 92
Health Ministry officials expressed concern that banning female circumci-
sion could potentially force the practice underground.93 A black market is
a possibility given the prevalence of the practice. 94 Female activists assert
that Egypt did not pass legislation criminalizing female circumcision
because it did not wish to upset Muslim religious leaders. 95 Egypt's princi-
pal Muslim clerics disagree on the legality of the practice. 96 The Grand
86. Egypt to Debate Law Banning Female Circumcision, PutERs, Oct. 3, 1994, avail-
able in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
87. ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 2, at 40-42.
88. The Egyptian penal code defines rape as any sexual intercourse without consent
of the woman and provides no exception for marital sex. Art. 267 of EPC, Law No. 58 of
197, cited in Mona Rishmawi, The Legal Status of Palestinian Women in the Occupied
Territories, in WOMEN OF ThE ARAB Wou.D 79, 85 (Nahid Toubia ed., 1988). This law
has been amended several times and remains good law.
89. As part of its coverage of the ICPD, the U.S. Cable News Network (CNN) broad-
cast footage of Egyptian parents observing the circumcision of their ten-year-old girl.
Egypt to Debate Law Banning Female Circumcision, supra note 86.
90. Siona Jenkins, Egypt's Secret, MoNmEAL GAzE-r, Nov. 26, 1994, at B3.
91. Egypt To Debate Law Banning Female Circumcision, supra note 86.
92. Jenkins, supra note 90, at B3.
93. Id.
94. Id. Currently, the procedure is prohibited in government hospitals and clinics.
Egypt Not To Pass Anti-Circumcision Law, supra note 76.
95. Note, What's Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female
Circumcision, 106 HARv. L. Ruv. 1944, 1951 (1993).
96. Id.
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Mufti, Sheik Mohammed Syed Tantawi, issued a legal opinion (fatwa) stat-
ing that female circumcision is not supported by either of two sources of
Islamic law: the Koran or the Ahadith, a collection of sayings ascribed to
the Prophet Mohammed.97 The Sheik of Al-Ashar University, Gad al-Haq
Ali Gad al-Haq, delivered a statement challenging that of Tantawi and
claiming the existence of several Ahadith which discuss female circumci-
sion. These writings prove that Islam condones the practice as long as it
occurs in hygienic conditions and as long as it involves the removal of only
minimal amounts of flesh.98 Tantawi later issued a second fatwa, reiterat-
ing that female circumcision represents a medical as opposed to a religious
issue.99 In support of his argument, he asserted that many other Muslim
countries, including Saudi Arabia where Islam originated, do not recognize
the practice. 100 Islamic leaders who assert that Islam does require the pro-
cedure have developed the following rationale. First, traditional Islam and
the Koran highly value sexual purity.10 ' Next, female circumcision pre-
vents promiscuity and ensures that young girls preserve their virginity until
they marry, because it provides for the removal of an organ that causes
women to become sexually dangerous. 102 Consequently, tradition and
Islam require female circumcision. 10 3
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of female circum-
cision, scholars agree that "the process of psychosexual development of the
girl is affected both directly by the operation itself and indirectly through
its social meaning and implications." 10 4 This process of socialization
defines the self-image of the adolescent girl and the adult woman. It may
foster extreme sexual frustration, fear of sexual urges, and a debilitating
sense of guilt for the presence of sexual desire. 10 5 In addition, the practice
of female circumcision likely contributes to a general lack of confidence
and aversion to risk-taking in Egyptian women.10 6 Thus, unless the prac-
tice is eliminated, women will continue to suffer disadvantages in both the
public and private realms that men do not.
IV. Islamic Influence on Egyptian Law
The Egyptian legal system also restricts the participation of women as
active members of society. In general, Islamic rules govern Egypt's per-
97. Id. The Grand Mufti is one of the three most influential Islamic leaders. The
other two are the head of al-Azhar Mosque and the Minister of Wakfs, respectively.
Aziza Hussein, Recent Amendments to Egypt's Personal Status Law, in WoMm AND THE
FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE EAsr 229, 230 (Elizabeth Warnock Fernea ed., 1985.)
98. Jenkins, supra note 90, at B3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Note, supra note 95, at 1951.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Toubia, supra note 54, at 155.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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sonal status laws.10 7 At its inception, Islamic law offered more protections
to women than did other seventh-century laws worldwide. 108 It granted
women an independent legal personality. As a result of this new status,
women obtained several new rights, including the right to own and dispose
of property without the assistance of men, to obtain a specific share of
inheritance, to receive an education, and to participate, at least minimally,
in public life. 10 9 In addition, the sharia restricted the practice of polygamy
to four wives and permitted women to obtain a divorce if they based their
requests on specified grounds. 10 Arguably, women received more rights
under the sharia than under any other legal system before the nineteenth
century.1 11
However, the laudable origins of the sharia do not excuse the fact that
today, women who live under Islamic law possess a status inferior to that
of women living under other contemporary legal systems. 1 12 The sharia
permits the inferior treatment of women in many respects. For example, a
woman's inheritance is only one-half of that of a man with the same degree
of relationship to the deceased.1 13 A woman may marry only one man,
while a man may marry up to four wives. 14 In addition, a woman must
seek a divorce before a male judge and base her request on certain specific
grounds, while a man may unilaterally divorce his wife at will without any
justification. 115
Western critics tend to view Islamic law as a significant barrier to the
achievement of gender equality."16 However, some scholars and feminist
activists believe that the Islamic religion neither prevents the empowerment
of women nor forbids family planning programs.1 17 Instead, some of these
scholars theorize that gender-discriminating members of Egyptian society
manipulate Islam in order to suppress their female counterparts. 18 Mem-
bers of this school of thought assert that those in favor of maintaining the
patriarchal nature of Egyptian society have manipulated Islam by citing
selective portions of the Koranic verses, passages from the sayings of the
Prophet, and the words of classical jurists in order to further their own
interests.1 19 Jehan Sadat, the wife of the late Egyptian President Anwar el-
107. See Mohamed A-Nowaihi, Changing the Law on Personal Status Within a Liberal
Interpretation of the Sharia, in THE CAmO PAPERs TN SocIAL ScIENcE, supra note 47, at 97,
101.
108. Abdulahi An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim
Context, 9 WHurrn L. Ray. 491, 495 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal Status of
Palestinian Women, 35 HAuv. INT'L LJ. 149, 150 (1994).
111. An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 495.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 496.
114. Wing, supra note 110, at 155.
115. An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 496.
116. See SADAT, supra note 45, at 328-29.
117. See Azer, supra note 47, at 61-62; MAcLEOD, supra note 28, at 76.
118. See Al-Nowaihi, supra note 107, at 112, 114.
119. See id.
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Sadat, and the conservative Egyptian thinker Muhammed Al Ghazali both
support the notion that the oppression of women is not based on Islam, but
on a misinterpretation of the sharia.120 In addition, Anwar el-Sadat noted
his concern about the "continuing misuse of religion as a mask behind
which man hides his vindictive desire to maintain his absolute supremacy
over woman by forcing her into servitude, making her the creature of his
whim, a mere vessel and purchasable ware." 121 According to this theory,
Islam in its pure form does not serve as a significant barrier to the empow-
erment of women. Unfortunately, Egypt has adopted numerous discrimi-
natory laws which, along with the traditional gender roles perpetuated by
Egypt's male-dominated society, create a substantial barrier to the empow-
erment of women. Consequently, if the ICPD is to empower women, Egypt
must eliminate discriminatory laws that are justified by mere "manipula-
tions" of the Islamic faith.
Several of Egypt's laws on marriage and divorce have disadvantaged
women to a considerable extent. Prior to 1929, men possessed a unilateral
right to divorce their wives. 122 In 1929, Egypt enacted Law No. 25, which
recognized for the first time four grounds on which a woman could sue her
husband for divorce: (1) failure to provide maintenance, (2) dangerous or
contagious disease, (3) desertion, and (4) mistreatment.12 3 This law lim-
ited the husband's unilateral right to divorce his wife at any time and for
any reason.124 However, it continued to discriminate against women by
requiring women to seek court assistance in order to secure a divorce,
while men did not need to do so. 1 2 5 In fact, a man could secure a divorce
by saying "I divorce thee" on three separate occasions in front of a desig-
nated number of witnesses.126 Consequently, the State gave legal force to
such pronouncements even if the man had made them jokingly, while
intoxicated or under compulsion. 127
In 1976, members of the Egyptian government proposed a law that
would enable a husband to divorce his wife at will without resort to the
courts, but only if he first informed his wife. 128 It also provided that while
120. See SADAT, supra note 45, at 328. On January 16, 1978, Mrs. Sadat said in a
Seminar on Civilizational Challenge that "if we wish woman to participate with all her
energy and capacity ... we must first accord her equal treatment .... We must accord
her rights under the liberal Shari'a." Al-Nowaihi, supra note 107, at 113.
121. AI-Nowaihi, supra note 107, at 112.
122. AnnaJenefsky, Permissibility of Egypt's Reservations to the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 15 MD. J. IrLrr'i L & TRADE 199,
217 (1991). Prior to 1929, a man could divorce his wife at will by unilateral repudiation
without explaining his reasons to anyone.
123. Law No. 25, 1929, cited inJoHN L Esposrro, WOMEN IN MUSUM FAmELY LAW 53-
54 (1982).
124. Id. at 58.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 30-33. See also Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 217.
127. Note that the Law of 1929 is an improvement over the old law in that a pro-
nouncement in jest, drunkenness, or under compulsion was given effect under the old
law, while it was considered to lack intent under the new law, and thus would be invalid.
Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 217.
128. Al-Nowaihi, supra note 107, at 110-11.
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the husband might marry a second, third, or fourth wife, he must first
inform the first wife so that she may exercise her right to sue for
divorce. 129 While this law represented a small step forward for women, it
did not come close to achieving marital equality. It did not provide for
punishment of men who illegally divorced their wives or exercised their
polygamy rights. In fact, if a wife proved that her husband had mistreated
her, she might succeed in divorcing him, but the courts would not require
her husband to pay any compensation. 130 This law did, however, provide
for the punishment of women who sued for divorce and were found to be
culpable for the demise of the relationship. 131 Consequently, the law
ensured that men would remain economically superior to their wives. 132
Fortunately, Egypt made some progress towards equality in 1976
when President Sadat revoked the House of Obedience Law. 133 The law
had provided that if a woman fled from the household, her husband could
demand that the police return her by force so that he could prevent her
from fleeing again.134 In addition, the husband could prevent his wife
from acquiring a divorce by using the incident as proof in court that she
had disobeyed his wishes. 135 Following the repeal of this law, Egyptian
men lost one of the many weapons that they used to dominate their
wives.136
Egyptian women secured even greater rights in 1979 when President
Sadat enacted Personal Status Law No. 44 by presidential decree while the
Parliament was in recess.137 This law represented a significant step in
favor of women's rights in that it required not only that a husband inform
his wife if he planned to divorce her, but also that the husband obtain a
notarized certificate of divorce. 138 Law No. 44 also provided that a wife
could divorce her husband if she believed that a subsequent marriage
harmed her or if the husband failed to inform her of a second, third, or
fourth marriage. 139 This law also granted a divorced woman with children
the right to remain in her marital home until she remarried or lost custody
of her children, and expanded a woman's entitlement to support by her ex-
husband following divorce. 140 Finally, Law No. 44 extended the age at
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. SADAT, supra note 45, at 354.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Law No. 44, 1979, cited in JOHN L. Esposrro, WOMEN IN MusuM FAMILY LAw 61-
63 (1982). See alsoJenefsky, supra note 122, at 218; Hooglund, supra note 39, at 128-29.
President Sadat enacted this law after much prodding by his wife, who was actively
involved in the feminist movement. See SADAT, supra note 45, at 362-63. To enact this
law, President Sadat used his constitutional power to issue a presidential decree during
a parliamentary recess. The parliament merely had to vote for confirmation when it
reconvened. JOHN L. EsPosrro, WoMmN IN MusIM FAMILY LAw 62 (1982).
138. See Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 218; Hooglund, supra note 39, at 129.
139. See Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 218.
140. Id. See also Hooglund, supra note 39, at 128-29.
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which a mother must automatically return her children to the custody of
their father, and provided a wife who left her husband with the right to
appeal to the courts if her husband attempted to have her forcibly
returned. 141
However, on May 4, 1985, the Supreme Court of Egypt struck down
Law No. 44 as unconstitutional. The Court held that Sadat had exceeded
his powers by enacting the law because presidents can make presidential
decrees only in "emergency" situations. 142 Several weeks later, Parliament
passed Law No. 100, the current Personal Status Law, which eliminated
several of the rights granted to women by Law No. 44.143 For example,
under the new law, a judge determines whether or not a husband's subse-
quent marriage actually harmed the wife, in which case she may invoke the
subsequent marriage as grounds for divorce. 144 Formerly, the wife made
that determination herself. In addition, Law No. 100 eliminates the provi-
sion in Law No. 44 allowing a divorced wife who maintains child custody
to remain in the marital home if she possesses no other options. 145 Fur-
thermore, under the current personal status law, men have retained the
right to practice polygamy and to obtain a divorce without judicial
approval. 146 Unless Egypt amends its personal status law so that women's
rights relating to divorce are equivalent to those of their male counterparts,
men will continue to suppress their wives, and women will remain
unempowered.
In addition to the civil laws, Egypt's criminal laws reinforce not only
the notion that women are subordinate to men, but also that women must
maintain sexual purity to a much greater extent than men. In traditional
Islamic society, a woman represents the source of her family honor.
147
This honor is tainted if female members of the family commit adultery or
lose their virginity before marriage. 148 Egypt categorizes most crimes
involving women as "crimes against honor" on the theory that these crimes
violate both the sexual freedom and sense of sexual modesty of women.
149
For example, the Penal Code provides that a man who commits adultery
will receive a maximum jail sentence of six months, while an adulterous
141. Id.
142. See Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 219.
143. Law No. 100, 1985, cited in NADiA HUAB, Wom cNowmu THE ARAB DEBATE ON
WOmEN AT WORK 35 (1988). See alsoJenefsky, supra note 122, at 219; Hooglund, supra
note 39, at 129. This law was passed only after a furious campaign by influential Egyp-
tian women. Lief, supra note 7, at 41.
144. HU A, supra note 143, at 35.
145. Id. See also Hooglund, supra note 39, at 129. But note that while Law No. 100
unquestionably discriminates against women, it moves forward by providing penalties to
aid in the enforcement of the laws. Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 219.
146. Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 219.
147. Melissa Spatz, Note, A "Lesser" Crime: A Comparative Study bf Legal Defense for
Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 597, 600 (1991).
148. Id.
149. Mohsen, supra note 59, at 17 ("Crimes against sexual honor" include such
crimes as rape, sexual assault, adultery and prostitution.).
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woman will receive a sentence of up to two years.15 0 In addition, if a man
discovers his wife committing adultery and kills his wife or her parmer, he
will receive a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment.15 l The
State, however, will charge a woman with murder if she similarly discovers
her husband committing adultery and kills him or his partner.' 5 2 Further-
more, a man can accuse his wife of committing adultery whether he discov-
ers her performing the act inside or outside of the marital home.' s 3 A
woman, on the other hand, cannot accuse her husband of committing adul-
tery unless she discovers him performing the act in her own home.' 5 4
These laws perpetuate the notion that women must maintain their sexual
purity while men need not do so.' 5 5 It is important to note that, according
to one scholar, these laws do not derive from Islamic law but rather from
the nineteenth century French Penal Code.'5 6 Therefore, these laws repre-
sent a misinterpretation of the sharia and an example of cultural norms
overriding religious norms.15 7 Egypt's repeal of these laws would consti-
tute an important step towards the empowerment of women.
One scholar, Professor Abdullahi An-Na'im, believes that the govern-
ment cannot simply eliminate the discriminatory laws.15 8 Instead he
believes that those who wish to improve the rights of women must
encourage Islamic leaders to fundamentally reformulate the sharia.1s 9 He
claims that Muslims are generally suspicious of what they understand to
be attempts to impose alien standards.160 Therefore, advocates of women's
rights must urge Islamic leaders to confirm that international standards of
women's rights are compatible with Islamic values. In other words, they
must demonstrate Islamic legitimacy for the international standards on the
rights of women. 16 1 He believes that it is possible for Islamic leaders to
interpret differently the provisions of the Koran and the Sunna that relate
to women's rights. 162 In the twentieth century, Muslims began to adopt the
western idea of gender equality and condoned practices incompatible with
the sharia. Muslim women became increasingly successful in achieving
equality in the public realms of education and employment.' 6 3 Conse-
quently, women's rights advocates today must rely on alternative interpre-
tations of Koran and Sunna in order to reform the sharia.16 4
150. Id. at 20.
151. Id. at 19.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Spatz, supra note 147, at 600-01.
156. Id. at 600 (citing telephone interview with Professor Gamal Badr, Professor of
Law and former member, Qatari Mission to the United Nations).
157. Id. at 600-01.
158. An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 500-01.
159. Id. at 500-01.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 498.
164. Id. at 500-01.
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Islamic nations have employed "sharia-based" arguments in the past to
eliminate policies previously deemed permissible under Islam.165 For
example, reformers in Tunisia abolished the law condoning polygamy. 166
They argued that the Koran provides that men must treat each of their
wives equally, and because it is not possible to treat unique individuals
exactly the same, polygamy has no justification. 167 Reformers in Tunisia
also abolished the practice of universal divorce by the husband (tulaq).168
They based their challenge of tulaq on several verses of the Koran that
emphasize the undesirability of divorce and the necessity of pursuing arbi-
tration in times of spousal conflict.169 Thus, it is possible for Islamic
nations to reform their laws by reinterpreting the sharia. However, funda-
mentalist groups will undoubtedly constrain such reform.' 70 In order to
avoid suspicion, members of the religious and cultural group, as opposed
to outsiders, must classify the discriminatory laws as oppressive. In addi-
tion, there must be room for external influence which is cognizant of cul-
tural concerns but committed to eliminating the oppression of women. 171
V. Egyptian Attempts to Achieve Equality
Despite these elements of discrimination in the Egyptian civil and criminal
codes, the Egyptian Constitution indicates that Egypt does advocate the
elimination of discrimination against women. Article 8 states that "[tihe
State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens."172 Further-
more, Article 11 notes that "[t]he State shall guarantee the proper coordina-
tion between the duties of woman towards the family and her work in the
society, considering her equal with man in the fields of political, social,
cultural and economic life without violation of the rules of Islamic juris-
prudence."173 However, Article 11 highlights two factors that have served
as significant barriers to the achievement of gender equality in Egypt.
First, the Constitution requires women, unlike their male counterparts, to
balance duties in both the public and the private realms.' 74 Second, it
hopes that women will achieve equality with men, but only to the extent
that their progression does not violate the rules of Islam.175 In the past,
these two factors have hindered Egypt's ability to adhere to international
standards of women's rights.
For example, in 1981, Egypt signed the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
165. Wing, supra note 110, at 161.
166. Id. at 166-67
167. Id.
168. Id. at 167.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 162.
171. An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 500-01.
172. EGYPT CONsTr. art. 8.
173. EGYPT CoNsT. art. 11.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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(CEDAW).1 76 CEDAW called for nations to eliminate inequality and to
abolish discriminatory laws, and encouraged participating nations to
ensure political, legal, educational, economic, and marital equality. 177 In
order to achieve widespread acceptance of its program, the Conference
allowed participating nations to submit reservations to the plan. Egypt
expressed reservations to Articles 2, 9, and 16, stating that it would imple-
ment these articles only to the extent that they did not prejudice Islamic
law. 17 8 Article 2 called for nations to combat discrimination by taking
legislative action.' 79 Article 9 provided that nations would grant women
equal rights with men regarding the nationality of their children.' 8 0 Arti-
cle 16 provided that parties must eliminate discrimination against women
in elements relating to marriage and family relations.1 8 1 In its reservation
to Article 16, Egypt stated that its obligations "must be without prejudice
to the Islamic sharia provisions .... This is out of respect for the sanctity
deriving from firm religious beliefs which govern marital relations in Egypt
and which may not be called into question.... " 18 2 Professor An-Na'im
claims that Egypt would not have entered its reservation if it had not
intended to comply with the Conference.' 8 3 However, other commentators
have stated that Egypt's signing of the treaty represented a mere formality
which would have little substantive effect on the societal position of Egyp-
tian women, but which might benefit Egyptian foreign relations. 184
Despite the reservation to CEDAW, women have made significant
strides in the legal, political, economic, and educational realms over the
past two decades. However, Egyptian women have not yet come close to
achieving equality with their male counterparts, and one must ask how
many women actually enjoy the rights that Egypt has recently secured for
them. Members of the middle and lower classes either remain unaware of
the legal developments or choose not to take advantage of them, fearing
that by doing so they will damage the reputations of their families.18 5 In
addition, while upper class women have actively participated in expanding
options, they have done so within religious and cultural restraints.1 8 6
Egypt specifically made a formal reservation at CEDAW, and endorsed the
176. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.Doc. A/34/
46 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
177. Jenefsky, supra note 122, at 202.
178. Bangladesh, Libya, Iraq, and Tunisia expressed similar reservations. Ann Eliza-
beth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a
Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 323-24 (1994).
179. CEDAW, supra note 176, at 193. See alsoJenefsky, supra note 122, at 205.
180. CEDAW, supra note 176, at 193. See also An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 512.
181. CEDAW, supra note 176, at 193. See also An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 513.
182. UunD NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEposrrD wrrH THE SEcn'ARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1990, at 165, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/9, U.N. Sales No. E.91.V.8
(1991).
183. An-Na'im, supra note 108, at 513.
184. See Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women Under Interna-
tional Refugee Law, 7 GEo. IMIGR. J. 511, 544 (1993).
185. AI-Nowaihi, supra note 107, at 98.
186. See discussion supra part I.
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compromise provision of the ICPD,18 7 which ensures that the program will
respect the religious, cultural, and ethical beliefs of each nation. 188 This
reservation indicates that Egypt will not willingly remove the religious and
cultural barriers that have blocked efforts to empower Egyptian women.
While conservative groups may be manipulating the doctrine of Islam
to create an illusion of religious resistance to female empowerment, Egypt's
discriminatory laws, cultural norms, and sexual standards represent genu-
ine and formidable obstacles to the achievement of equality. Egypt's adop-
tion of practices such as the gender-based division of labor, veiling, female
circumcision, and confinement of women to the home undermines
women's legal entitlement to rights and hinders their ability to achieve eco-
nomic and intellectual independence. In addition, although contraception
does not violate Islamic law, many conservative religious leaders regard it
as part of a Western plot to liberate Egyptian society. Because Islamic lead-
ers continue to promote that misunderstanding and lower and middle class
women continue to regard children as assets, the family planning effort of
the past twenty years has remained exceedingly modest.189 The Egyptian
government must eliminate these misconceptions if it is to fulfill its com-
mitment to the Conference. Unfortunately, the compromise clause
inserted into the ICPD document holds that the recommendations of the
Conference will respect the cultural values of each participating nation. 190
Therefore, Egypt is under no obligation to change its religious and cultural
values. Unless Egypt eliminates its discriminatory laws, traditional gender
roles, and sexual standards, its commitment to the ICPD, like its commit-
ment to CEDAW, will remain relatively meager.
VI. Reforms Necessary for Egypt to Implement the Recommendations
of the Conference
In the dosing session of the ICPD, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa
noted that President Hosni Mubarak had emphasized several important
points regarding the Conference. First, Mubarak had insisted that the
implementation of the program be based on the principles of divine
187. Egypt did not make a "formal" reservation to the ICPD but insisted that it would
only implement the program to the extent that it did not violate Islamic law. President
Muhammed Hosni Mubarak stated:
We have been quite keen to make our population programme conforming to the
established religious values, because we deeply believe that the values of true
religion is a strong impetus toward reform as long as intentions are good, toler-
ance is prevalent, and all of us are keen on content and significance rather than
on form and appearance.
Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, Address Before the Inaugural Session of the ICPD (Sept. 5,
1994) [hereinafter Mubarak Address].
188. Samia Nakhoul, U.N. Conference Ends with Victory on Population, Raurms, Sept.
13, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS Database.
189. Abdel Rahim Omran, On the Population Problem and the Future of Egypt, in EGXFr:
OLD REaunas AND NeV VISION 40, 57-60 (Edward E. Azar & Abdel tK Omran eds.,
1987).
190. Hooper, supra note 8, at 10.
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laws. 191 Second, he had ordered that the Conference fully respect the
social values and legislation of participating nations. 192 Third, he had
emphasized that the family, with its deep religious and social foundations,
must remain the basic nucleus of society.193 Finally, he had assured the
Conference of Egypt's commitment to achieving equal rights for women, as
stated in the national constitution. 194
There exist several reasons to believe that Egypt may succeed in future
efforts to control its population. For instance, President Mubarak strongly
advocates slow population growth and has extended major media cam-
paigns to all parts of the country. 195 Furthermore, as Egypt becomes
increasingly acculturated, women are beginning to reject traditional gender
norms. 196 Even if the family remains the foundation of Egyptian society,
Egypt will be able to implement the recommendations of the program if it
can overcome the religious and cultural elements that have previously hin-
dered the empowerment of women. However, women's rights advocates
will not empower Egyptian women without a significant struggle.
If scholars are correct in "asserting that Islam in its pure form does not
forbid the empowerment of women," 197 then religion will not serve as a
barrier to the program so long as Egyptian leaders invalidate corrupt reli-
gious interpretations by fundamentalist groups. In fact, a plan consistent
with religious values may arouse enthusiasm for voluntary participation in
the programs. 198 However, Egypt will succeed in eliminating these laws
only if it persuades Islamic leaders to reinterpret the sharia.'99 The ICPD
emphasizes that for the program to succeed, Egypt will have to abolish its
traditional gender roles and stringent sexual standards in order to
empower its women and to ensure that women gain control over their own
fertility.200 To accomplish this goal, Egypt must complete two steps simul-
taneously. First, the leadership must eliminate the discriminatory nature
of Egyptian laws. Second, Egypt must educate women of all classes and
ages to assure that they achieve economic independence and have access to
reproductive information and services.
191. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa, Address At the Closing Session of the
ICPD (Sept. 15, 1994).
192. Id.
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195. Omran, supra note 189, at 57-60.
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199. See supra text accompanying notes 158-64. In Egypt, the sharia is frequently
reinterpreted by religious and legal authorities. The courts then implement the changes.
The State relies on the religious hierarchy to provide legitimacy for its policies. MAC.
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A. Elimination of Laws Perpetuating Traditional Gender Roles and
Sexual Standards
Egyptian women will unquestionably remain unempowered in Egypt until
the State eliminates the discrimination present in its personal status and
criminal laws. These laws reinforce the notion of female inferiority to men
and suppress women by assuring that they remain economically depen-
dent on their husbands. Consequently, these laws, if left untouched, will
prevent the State not only from implementing the recommendations of the
ICPD but also from fulfilling its obligations under Article 8 of the Constitu-
tion which provides that "the State shall guarantee equality of opportunity
to all citizens."20 1
1. Islamic Legitimacy as an Essential Component of Legal Reform
Law can serve as an effective instrument to transform cultural practices. 20 2
However, the passage of new laws will not easily eliminate widely practiced
customary and religious traditions. Instead, to encourage voluntary com-
pliance with new laws and cultural movements, proponents of change must
provide Islamic legitimacy for the reforms that they propose.20 3 Advocates
of women's rights must encourage Islamic leaders to acknowledge that the
ideas of gender equality, respect, and individual freedom are not alien
western conceptions but are compatible with Islamic law and the visions of
the Prophet Mohammed. Islamic religion itself may not prevent the
empowerment of women, but those who interpret it tend to support the
subjugation of women. Thus, women's rights advocates must focus their
efforts on influencing the perceptions and power of the traditional Islamic
leaders and the institutions which educate them. That Islam itself is not
the root of the problem and can be interpreted in many ways is supported
by the fact that Islam is not a monolithic religion. As one scholar has
noted:
There are profoundly different social groupings within the community of
Islam, and between those who have adopted "western" values and lead essen-
tially secular, worldly lives-consuming western media and styles-and those
who renounce and denounce those influences and modes of behavior.
Women are very much caught up in these cross-currents of change and
reaction. 20 4
The influence that Islam exerts over legal and political systems varies
greatly among nations containing Muslim constituents. For example,
Senegal and Gambia have secular and generally democratic governments,
and both countries possess extremely active human rights nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGO's).20 5 The professedly "authentic" Islamic states of
201. EGT CONsr. art. 8.
202. Note, supra note 95, at 1957.
203. Wing, supra note 110, at 167.
204. James C.N. Paul, Islam and the State: The Problems of Establishing Legitimacy and
Human Rights, 12 Canozo L. REv. 1057, 1062 (1991).
205. Id. at 1058.
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Saudi Arabia and Iran represent the opposite extreme.206 These states
deny the constitutional legitimacy of secular and universal human rights
law.20 7 Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in existence, officially recog-
nizes the sharia for some purposes, but Islam does not represent a strong
political force in most areas of the country. 20 8
The diverse effects that Islam exerts in different Islamic countries
derives not only from local interpretations of Islam but also from histori-
cal, cultural, and social factors. Thus, widespread participation will be
essential to any effort to eliminate gender discrimination.20 9 Advocates of
women's rights will have to enlist the assistance of religious leaders,
women's groups, and women in general to eliminate discriminatory laws
and cultural practices. First, with the assistance of women's groups,
women's rights advocates must persuade religious leaders either that the
discriminatory laws are either patriarchal misinterpretations of Islam, or
that Islam can be reinterpreted to conform with contemporary views
regarding the rights of women. This change in interpretation is possible
because religious law is not static, and the duty to maintain Islam does not
require Islamic leaders to adhere to historical interpretations of Islam.
Islam "is modified over time by custom and practice even within religious
traditions that insist on the immutability of the law as defined in religious
texts held to be divinely inspired."210 Once Islamic leaders and women's
organizations create greater rights for women based on new interpretations
of the Koran and Sunna, they must convince Egyptian women that this
corpus of law promotes the fundamental interests of women. Then Egyp-
tian women may begin to exercise those rights and alter their cultural
surroundings. 211
Initially this process will not completely transform the rights of Egyp-
tian women for two reasons. First, movements towards gender equality
and the empowerment of women generally have been limited to urban cen-
ters. Traditional norms continue to govern the rights of rural women who
represent the majority of Muslim women. Education represents the solu-
tion to this problem. 212 Second, efforts to empower women encourage
rebellion by fundamentalist Islamic groups that wish to reassert the sharia
as the exclusive source of both public and private law.2 13
2. Methods to Minimize the Fundamentalist Backlash Against Reform: The
Importance of Gradual Reform and Women's Organizations
Various scholars warn that if legal reform proceeds too quickly, traditional
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1058-59.
209. Id. at 1061.
210. Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework
For Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 795, 805 (1992).
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213. An-Na'im supra note 108, at 498-99.
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forces may backlash and further subjugate women.214 The changing status
of women in Iran provides an example of the tremendous damage that fun-
damentalists can do to women's rights. During the era of Shah Reza Pah-
lavi, the ruler of Iran prior to Khomeini, Iran modified the sharia
considerably in order to give women greater rights in the workplace and in
the family.215 However, the Khomeini regime obliterated this liberal trend
toward gender equality. Khomeini revived traditional law, which empha-
sizes the importance of family values and the concept that women should
remain in the home and raise "Islamic" children. 216 Iran has passed new
laws that order the removal of women from the workplace and seclude
them in the home.217 Khomeini did perhaps the most damage to women's
rights when he repealed the Family Protection Law.2 18 The law, passed
during the Shah's era, set fifteen as a minimum age of marriage for girls.219
Iran amended the law in 1975 in order to raise the minimum to eighteen
years of age.2 20 The original law also restricted the practice of polygamy
by requiring the consent of the first wife before permitting a man to marry
another wife. 221 Even if the first wife consented to the second marriage, a
judge could allow the additional marriage only if the man demonstrated
the existence of certain conditions, such as the sterility of the first wife.222
In addition, the law enabled Iranian women to divorce their husbands
more easily and restricted the ability of men to obtain unilateral, uncon-
tested divorces. 223 Unfortunately, Khomeini repealed the Act, claiming
that it violated Islam.22 4 The Iranian government removed the restrictions
on polygamy and no longer required the consent of the first wife in order
for husbands to marry additional wives. Thus, the Khomeini regime actu-
ally favors polygamy. 225 In addition, the minimum age of marriage for
girls is now thirteen. Women have lost certain rights to seek and contest
divorces, while men now enjoy the traditional right to obtain a unilateral
divorce if they provide the required number of witnesses. 226 The Iranian
government encountered little protest as it realigned the role of women and
the family with traditional Islamic interpretations. 227
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Without question, Egyptian law reformers must take precautions to
ensure that Egypt does not experience a fundamentalist attack similar to
that experienced in Iran. Unfortunately, the legal and cultural traditions
currently observed in Egypt exhibit characteristics indicating that a back-
lash movement already exists in Egypt. For example, Egyptian society sig-
nals to women that they will jeopardize their femininity and the honor of
their families unless they remain at home to produce children.228 In addi-
tion, to ensure that women remain in the private realm, Egyptian society
has confined, mutilated, silenced, and controlled the bodies of women.229
While Egyptian men have accepted, to a certain extent, the emergence of
Egyptian women into the public realms of education, employment, and
politics, they have maintained control over women with practices such as
veiling and female circumcision.
Additional evidence exists indicating that a tide of Islamic fundamen-
talism is currently rising in Egypt. Recently, two influential Egyptian
women have received death threats from Muslim radicals. 230 In fact, femi-
nist author Nawal Sa'adawi left the country after she received a threat from
an Islamic group and after the Egyptian government eliminated her
women's group, the Arab Women's Solidarity Association.231 Women
themselves are responsible for some of the backlash. Zeinab al-Gazzali
leads the women's branch of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. She lectures to women about an alternative "Islamic" feminism.232
She believes in the segregation of workplaces, hospitals, and schools and
believes that women must wear veils in order to maintain their honor.233
She asserts that women should not work, and that husbands may beat their
wives as long as they strike lightly and do not hit them in the face. 23 4
Further evidence of the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism is the
general pattern of fainting that occurred recently among hundreds of teen-
age girls at several dozen high schools across Egypt. Ekbal Baraka, a lead-
ing journalist and feminist in Egypt, has noted that the fainting represented
a protest against the uncertainty society had imposed on young women. 235
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism has contributed to their indecision
because fundamentalists insist that modern Egypt is corrupt and calls for a
return to traditional values, including the veiling of women, and the move-
ment of women from both schools and workplaces into the home.23 6
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Although a backlash movement already has begun in Egypt, Egyptian
women likely will not suffer the fate of Iranian women. Egyptian women
generally have experienced too much exposure to the public realm to allow
Islamic insurgents to force them back into the home. They do not live in a
vacuum. Television and international advertising have exposed them as to
the concepts of equality and empowerment.2 7 However, if advocates of
women's rights take some precautions, they will avoid unnecessary battles
with religious opponents.
Some scholars suggest Islamic societies interested in empowering their
women should tinker with the law instead of passing "sweeping"
reforms,238 which clearly would conflict with Islamic custom and cultural
traditions. Traditionalist forces would oppose "sweeping" changes, claim-
ing that they lack legitimacy.239 Consequently, the people would be
unwilling to comply with the new laws, fearing that they would be pun-
ished for failure to conform with the traditional laws and customs. 240 A
gradual reformist approach is more likely to avoid a hostile resurgence of
traditional Islam.2 4 1 As suggested earlier, the proponents of reform must
reveal to Islamic leaders that the rights of women do not represent alien
western ideas, but rather conform to the ideals of Islamic religion and
Egyptian culture. Women's rights advocates must then persuade the
Islamic leaders to reform the sharia so that the Egyptian government may
pass new laws empowering women. This process would undoubtedly take
more time than a sweeping reform of Egyptian law. However, it would
more likely lead to voluntary compliance by the Egyptian people.242 As
President Mubarak indicated, members of Egyptian society are more will-
ing to accept social reform if they believe that Islamic leaders have catego-
rized the reforms as legitimate.243 Even gradual legal reform will not
succeed if the cultural beliefs and practices of Egyptian society remain the
same. Therefore, education necessarily will play an essential role in the
empowerment of women.
In view of the growing backlash, Egyptian women must join forces and
reorganize. They already appear to be doing so to a certain extent. For
example, President Mubarak's wife has avoided women's issues for over a
decade, fearing the criticism that her predecessor Jehan Sadat received.244
However, she has agreed to chair a commission to examine women's
issues.245 In the past, female organizations in Islamic countries have made
significant strides towards gender equality. For example, in Iraq women
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have successfully expanded and maintained their social and civil rights.2 4 6
Most of the progress towards gender equality enjoyed by Iraqi women can
be attributed to the General Federation of Iraqi Women, an organization
that became active after the Iraqi Revolution of 1968.247 The Federation
established a national network which provides legal advice and operates
employment, education, and training centers for both women and men. In
addition, it advocates new laws to protect the rights of women. The Federa-
tion also studies the effect of existing laws on women and submits pro-
posed reforms to the government.248 The government has enacted most of
its suggestions into law.249 For example, the Iraqi government has passed
an amendment to the civil status law which deals with divorce, child cus-
tody, and maternity leave. 250 The amendment declares arbitrary divorce
illegal and restricts the practice of bigamy or polygamy. 25 ' Under the cur-
rent law, a husband must provide a convincing reason for a second mar-
riage and his first wife must approve of the second marriage in order for a
judge to grant permission.25 2 The Federation has also increased the length
of maternity leave for Iraqi civil servants from forty-two days to one year,
and the employment laws now require equality of opportunity, pay, and
education. 25 3
As a first step towards fulfilling its commitment to ICPD, the Egyptian
government must support women's groups. These groups are best suited
for determining which laws disadvantage women. They can persuade reli-
gious leaders that the elimination of those laws would conform to the prin-
ciples of Islam. In addition, women's groups will play a key role in the
education of both urban and rural women. Unfortunately, instead of pro-
moting women's organizations, the Egyptian government recently dis-
solved the Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA). 254 AWSA
promoted equality between the sexes in the Arab world. It focused on
advancing the rights of women in social, cultural, economic, and political
spheres. 255 More such groups are needed. Once women throughout Egypt
become educated as to the rights that they deserve, they will become
empowered by working together to put aside their fear of deviation from
the cultural norm, to exercise their newly-found rights, and to alter their
cultural environment.
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B. Education: The Key to Empowering Women and Implementing the
Population Plan
The ICPD program acknowledges that education is essential to the empow-
erment of women and, thus, to the implementation of the program.25 6
Education represents the key to eliminating traditional gender roles and
discriminatory sexual standards. While the elimination of discriminatory
laws will enable women to reclaim some degree of power over their lives,
cultural norms will remain a barrier to the empowerment of women and to
their ability to control their own reproduction. Social change must come
from forces within society, yet transformation is frequently hindered by an
imbalance of power favoring those who wish to maintain the status quo.2 57
By convincing Islamic leaders that such change conforms to the doctrine of
Islam, advocates of women's rights can shift power away from those who
wish to maintain the status quo. Unfortunately, those who favor the status
quo will still outnumber advocates for women's rights. Societal pressures
to conform hamper women's abilities to achieve social and political
change. 258 According to one scholar, this "problem of transition is created
by an existing system of power that makes any non-conforming patterns of
behavior appear deviant, which in turn makes it relatively easy to maintain
and increase the differential in the social rewards between conformist pat-
terns of behavior and non-conformist ones .... ,,259
Thus, women's groups must empower women by educating them. In
the past, women in Egypt and the Sudan have suffered discrimination in
the distribution of educational services because of both the small number
of facilities available for girls and the quality of education that those facili-
ties have provided. 260 In addition, with the exception of home economics
courses, the curricula offered by these schools have been completely male-
oriented.2 61 Consequently, advocates of change must initiate and the
Egyptian government must support widespread education campaigns in
both urban and rural areas to gain the support of women throughout the
nation. Also, the government must remove the male bias from the curric-
ula and provide women and girls with information regarding their repro-
ductive health. According to Article 16 of the Constitution, Egypt
guarantees cultural, social, and health services to its citizens in the villages
in order to raise their standards of living.26 2 Therefore, the government
should support any campaign to educate women. Enlightened with the
knowledge that change is essential to further their fundamental interests of
women, women will work together to accomplish that change and will not
fear revolting against the cultural norm.
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The following example illustrates the process that empowerment pro-
ponents will need to follow to effectuate social change. To eliminate the
practice of female circumcision, activists must first convince religious lead-
ers that Islam supports the illegalization of the practice. This change in
attitude toward the practice is not an impossibility. Although Islamic lead-
ers in Egypt are divided on the issue, Islam does not require the proce-
dure. 26 3 Next, reform advocates must educate women about the negative
effects of the practice so that they will collectively exercise the right not to
submit their daughters to the atrocious procedure. Even if women do not
like a traditional practice such as female circumcision, they may feel obli-
gated to force their daughters to undergo the procedure to ensure that they
do not become social outcasts. 26 4 However, if women's groups advocate
the education of Egyptian women and encourage them to face the opposi-
tion as a unit instead of as individuals, the groups may gain enough sup-
port to override the political power of those who favor maintaining the
practice.
The Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the
Health of Women and Children conducts educational programs for women
and traditional birth attendants in Nigeria.2 65 The Committee focuses on
female genital mutilation as a general health problem instead of as a
women's health problem. 26 6 Proponents of the health approach assert that
it is effective because it is easier for people to accept than are approaches
that combat the practice on religious or cultural grounds.2 67 However,
those who advocate the elimination of female circumcision should not
frame their campaign against the practice exclusively as a health issue,
unless "health" is understood to include psychological and emotional as
well as physical health issues.268 Regardless of which educational method
is eventually adopted, Aziza Hussein, head of the Cairo Family Planning
Association, offers some encouragement that Egypt may some day elimi-
nate the practice of female circumcision. She asserts that greater education
will lead to a change in the practice as women begin to understand that the
circumcision is associated not with religion, but rather with ideas about
morality, the honor of women, and the family. 269
1. The Role of Education in the Socialization Process
Education is essential to the empowerment of women because it enables
them to support legal and cultural changes paramount to advancing their
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fundamental interests. Education is vital for other reasons as well. First,
as part of the socialization process, Islamic society teaches children at an
early age that women are inferior to men.2 70 In Iran, the Khomeini regime
used the education system effectively as an instrument to return women to
their traditional role in society.2 71 The regime banned coeducation and
forced elementary schools to become segregated. 272 It also prohibited
young married women from attending high school.273 In addition, the gov-
ernment ordered a transformation of the curriculum. Girls' schools
emphasized subjects to prepare young women for their roles as wives and
mothers or for careers such as sewing, nursing, or teaching in girls
schools. 2 74 Finally, the government required textbooks to be rewritten in
order to teach Iranian children that the "new Islamic woman" wears proper
Islamic dress and works in the home.
275
Because these actions have proved so successful in suppressing Ira-
nian women, the Egyptian government just as easily could use education to
eliminate traditional gender roles in Egypt. In addition, studies conducted
in Baghdad have revealed that schools play an important part in transform-
ing the role of women.276 These studies revealed that education influ-
enced several lifestyle variables, including dress, employment, social and
political activity, and family roles.2 77 The Egyptian government should
support coeducational schools and should select specific curricula and
textbooks to teach both boys and girls that women are equal to men.
2. The Role of Education in the Creation of Equal Opportunity
If Egypt strives to assure equal educational opportunities for women, then
women will acquire the skills and intellectual abilities to compete equally
with men both politically and economically. Education will empower
women and instill in them a sense of public accomplishment so that they
no longer will regard their childbearing abilities as a measure of their own
value.278 A strong correlation exists between the level of education and
rates of fertility. According to population estimates in 1960, statistics
revealed that illiterate wives and wives that could only read but not write
possessed the largest average of births, reaching 4.47 among illiterates and
4.95 among literates. 279 Those wives who had received primary certificates
gave birth to an average of 3.56 children, while those who had received
secondary certificates had an average of 2.21 children. In contrast, those
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with university degrees averaged only 1.81 children.28 0 This statistical
trend holds true in other Islamic nations as well. In Baghdad, studies have
revealed not only near universal employment of women with diplomas, but
also that women with increased levels of education give birth to fewer
children. 28 1
3. Education as an Essential Tool for the Proliferation of Reproductive
Health Care Information
Through education women and girls will receive information about repro-
ductive health care. The right to reproductive health care is the right to
lead safe and satisfying sex lives, with the freedom to decide if, when, and
how often to reproduce.28 2 The State must provide women and men with
information regarding reproductive health so that they may effectively exer-
cise these rights. The ICPD recommended that reproductive health care
encompass the areas of family planning, prenatal care, delivery and post-
natal care, health care for women and infants, prevention of infertility and
sexually transmitted diseases, prevention of abortion, and management of
abortion complications.2 83
The ICPD recognized that the principle of informed free choice is
essential to the achievement of reproductive health. Unfortunately, the full
range of family planning methods are currently unavailable to at least 350
million couples worldwide. 284 Women who are confined to the home
undoubtedly lack the information needed to make a free choice. Further-
more, fundamentalist Islamic groups disapprove of family planning and try
to influence uneducated members of the lower and middle classes to avoid
reproductive health clinics. 28 5 Strong adherents to Islam oppose family
planning because they believe that girls must remain pure, and that educa-
tion regarding reproductive health will taint their purity and threaten the
honor of patrilineal families throughout Egypt. They fear that if women
become educated regarding their reproductive health, men will lose their
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controlling influence, and woman will disrupt society with their strong sex-
ual natures. The fundamentalists argue that Islam acknowledges sex
within the marriage unit alone. 286 They also argue that free exchange of
information regarding sexual relations, especially among adolescents,
would encourage young women to engage in sexual relations outside the
marital realm. This behavior would endanger the reputation and honor of
the family, the most fundamental unit of Egyptian society.28 7 In reality,
however, Islam itself does not prohibit family planning.288 Women will
remain unable to take control of their own fertility until the State exposes
them to this information.
Egypt's Family Planning Program, created in 1965, has met with only
modest success despite the fact that by 1979 it had led to the establishment
of 3030 government-run family planning centers and 430 private family
planning centers.289 The marginal impact of the Programme indicates that
organizational structure alone will not enable women to take control of
their own fertility; the State must make information and services accessible
to women of all classes and localities.290
4. The Constitutional Right of Women to Equal Educational Opportunities
and the Cultural Restraints Which Hinder Egyptian Women's Enjoyment
of that Right
Article 18 of the Egyptian Constitution provides that the State guarantees
the right to education. 291 Primary education is obligatory for both boys
and girls at age six.2 92 Furthermore, Article 21 provides that "combating
illiteracy shall be a national duty for which all the people's energies should
be mobilized."293 However, while Egypt apparently allows equal access to
educational services, women do not, in reality, enjoy equal educational
opportunities due to cultural constraints. 29 4 First, traditional gender roles
reinforce the notion that women belong in the private instead of the public
realm.295 Second, men often confine women to the home in an effort to
prevent them from tainting their sexual reputation and the honor of the
family.296 Therefore, in order to empower women, Egypt must eliminate
the traditional gender roles and the notion that a family's honor depends
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upon the purity of its female members. This task will not be an easy one.
The concept of family honor is rooted in Egyptian culture, and men will be
unwilling to give up their control over women's sexuality, regarding that
control as a symbol of their dominant position in society. 297
While the Constitution guarantees gender equality in the realms of
political, social, cultural, and economic life, it does so only to the extent
that such equality does not violate the rules of Islam. Therefore, in order to
eliminate traditional gender roles and sexual standards, women's rights
advocates will have to persuade Islamic leaders to reformulate the sharia so
that it conforms to contemporary beliefs about gender relations. The pre-
vailing religious ideology that women are the source of temptation and evil
hinders the advancement of women in the public realm.29 8 It is possible,
however, for Islamic leaders to reinterpret this portion of Islam. First, the
sharia requires not only women, but also men, to conduct themselves in a
modest manner. It requires both men and women to avoid illicit sexual
relations. Therefore, it is possible to reformulate Islam so that society no
longer regards women as the sole source of seduction but instead requires
both women and men to maintain their modesty. Thus, rather than confin-
ing women to the home in order to control their sexual urges, men must
take control of their own sexuality and take responsibility for their owns
sins.
If Islamic leaders legitimate this reinterpretation of the sharia, Egyp-
tian women could make significant strides towards equality. Women's
groups would have to teach women throughout Egypt about the implica-
tions of the new interpretation. Women could then work together to alter
their cultural surroundings. The new interpretation would enable them to
emerge more easily into the public realm to obtain employment and an
education. As a result of the new interpretation, women could become eco-
nomically independent from their husbands and could obtain information
regarding their reproductive health. Such a reinterpretation of Islam is
essential to eliminating traditional gender roles and sexual standards as
well as upholding the objectives of the ICPD.
Conclusion
The legal and cultural traditions currently observed in Egypt indicate that a
backlash movement already exists in that country. Egyptian society signals
to women that they will jeopardize their femininity and the honor of their
families unless they remain secluded in the home. In addition, to ensure
that women remain in the private realm, Egyptian society has used the
practices of the veil and female circumcision to confine, mutilate, and con-
trol the bodies of women. Over the past few decades, Egyptian men have
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begun to accept the emergence of Egyptian women into the public realms
of education, employment, and politics. However, throughout this period
men have maintained control over the sexuality of women and prevented
women from achieving gender equality in Egyptian society. Therefore, to
empower women and thus implement the population plan, Egypt must
eliminate traditional gender roles and allow its women to take control of
their own bodies.
The compromise clause inserted into the ICPD program provides that
the Conference recommendations must respect the sovereign right,
national laws, cultural background, and religious and ethical values of
each nation. If Egypt fulfills the program without reconceptualizing its
religious and cultural traditions, Egyptian women will remain
unempowered and unable to assert control over their reproductive poten-
tial. Despite past commitments to eliminate discrimination, Egyptian soci-
ety has continued to perpetuate gender roles and sexual standards which
ensure that women remain subordinate to men.
Egypt can fulfill the objectives of the Conference if it makes several
reforms. First, Egypt must eliminate the personal status and criminal laws
which support the traditional gender roles and sexual standards. In addi-
tion, Egypt must educate its women. The dissemination of information not
only will provide women with an awareness of their new rights and an
economic independence from their husbands, but also will educate them
in matters of sexual health and contraception so that they may assist their
country in the control of its population. Finally, to prevent Egypt's male-
dominated society from retaliating further against women, Egypt must not
make sweeping law reforms but instead should make reforms more gradu-
ally by persuading religious leaders that such changes are consistent with
Islamic doctrine. As President Mubarak indicated, Egyptian society will
accept social reform more willingly if its members believe that Islamic lead-
ers have endorsed the reforms.

